“The ‘Concept’ has fallen” has become a common sentiment on Israeli social media since the horrific attacks by Hamas on Simḥat Torah. But what is The Concept, and why did it fall?
The Concept, more commonly called the “status quo” in English, has been the guiding philosophy of Israel’s security establishment since the Oslo era, formed in response to the First Intifada and evolved through the South Lebanon Conflict, Second Intifada, and Battle of Gaza. The Concept has seen Israel retreat from Palestinian cities in the 1995 Oslo II Accords, the 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and the 2005 Gaza Disengagement.
The twin pillars of the Concept are territorial appeasement and conflict containment.
In the past 30 years, Israel has entrusted several previously controlled territories to hostile terrorist groups while maintaining a level of control over these territories through superior perimetral military might, superior technological ability, and periodic “mowing the lawn” incursions, ostensibly managing these conflicts rather than decisively winning them – containing terror groups rather than destroying them.
The Concept has its origins in former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “sovereignty-for-security” regional vision for Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders (reducing its sovereignty) in exchange for a “qualitative military edge”- American weapons, money, technology, and assurances (ostensibly increasing its security).
The Concept is built on three assumptions that have been brought into question over the last two weeks: that distant conflict management is more internationally acceptable than ground force occupation, that the responsibilities of governance and integration into the community of nations will moderate previously violent terrorist groups, and that US-provided weapons, money, technology, and assurances are preferable to sovereignty and military readiness when it comes to national security. Exploring the rationales between these three assumptions and how the Simḥat Torah attacks have brought each of them into question is essential to understanding the Concept and how it fell.
1. Distant conflict management is more internationally acceptable than ground force occupation
“Had we not withdrawn when we did, the situation would have been much worse,” explained Ehud Barak In a 2002 post-premiership interview with Benny Morris. “We would have faced a struggle on two fronts, in Palestine and in South Lebanon, and Hezbollah would have enjoyed international legitimacy in their struggle against a foreign occupier.”
The idea that an Israeli containment of terrorist groups from outside their territories rather than crushing them and holding these territories themselves was not only a driving rationale behind the South Lebanon Withdrawal but also the Oslo Accords, Gaza Disengagement, and maintenance of these policies. These moves, however, have only made Israeli policy appear less legitimate.
When we relate to ourselves as “foreign occupiers” in Gaza, South Lebanon, or the West Bank, we are also relating to ourselves as such in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and communicating to the world our entire cause is unjust, and therefore anything and everything we do is illegitimate.
The Simḥat Torah attacks and social media responses in the West have exacerbated this reality greatly. Though many thought the Gaza Disengagement would legitimize Israel as a peace-pursuing state and delegitimize the Palestinian terror factions as blood-lusting and unappeasable, the exact opposite happened. Israel became only viewed as less legitimate, a country that does not even believe its own story about being the rightful sovereign of this land, while the Palestinian terror factions have gained more sympathy, as even by Israeli omission they are just in their cause of ridding those who do not belong from this land.
2. The responsibilities of governance and integration into the community of nations will moderate previously violent terrorist groups
In May 2023, the Israeli security establishment declared victory at the conclusion of Operation Shield and Arrow. Through diplomatic and economic pressures (chiefly the provision of work permits for Gazans), Israel was able to keep Hamas out of the clash with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), eventually compelling Hamas to force PIJ into a ceasefire, allegedly against the wishes of Iran.
Yes, Israel indirectly ceded Hamas power by surrendering Gaza in 2005 and standing by as Hamas won a popular election and conquered the territory from Fatah in 2007, but that power made Hamas vulnerable. Power made Hamas responsible for the well-being of the Gazan people and responsible as a de facto member of the community of nations – under popular pressure from within and interstate pressure from without. Through these pressures, Hamas should moderate, avoid wars, and clamp down on terrorism as it did during Shield and Arrow.
On Simḥat Torah, we saw that this is not the case. Hamas did not stay out of Shield and Arrow because they wanted to maintain work permits for Gazans, but rather because they were training and saving their strength for a serious attack.
While this was true for Fatah before Hamas – who rebranded as a polite government during the Oslo era while also being the driving force behind the Second Intifada and anti-Israel terrorism since – Simḥat Torah was a singular and definitive nail in this assumption. Sovereignty over territory has not made terrorist organizations more responsible, accountable, or vulnerable, but rather more powerful and threatening.
3. American provisions are more important to security than sovereignty
While the British appeasement policy of ceding territorial concessions to Nazi Germany in exchange for the avoidance of conflict is generally considered a colossal failure, some contemporary foreign policy experts, like Norrim M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, actually consider it an overlooked success crucial to the Allied victory in World War II.
In the pair’s 2008 paper “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,“ Ripsman and Levy argue that Britain was playing a game of time. In 1937, the year Neville Chamberlain ascended to the British premiership, Germany was far and away the strongest military and technological power in Europe. But the other European powers had either great untapped resources (like Russia) or vast colonial empires (like Britain or France) that would allow them – in time – to surpass Germany’s great but already maximized strength.
Ripsman and Levy argue that in delaying direct conflict with Germany until September 1939, Britain could buy itself the time to eclipse Germany’s strength and defeat them. Had they forsaken appeasement and begun the war as little as a year sooner, they would have been trounced.
The validity of this theory is a matter of debate, but it is certainly true that this has been the opinion of the Israeli security establishment regarding our current enemies. Israel has pursued a policy of appeasement with our foes, ceding them territory and avoiding conflict, buying time to replenish our strength through the American empire.
We should also keep in mind that one of the primary reasons for the failed Concept is that Israel’s military establishment has seemingly ruled out any option disobedient to US demands. Washington still seeks to divide our land into two separate states and any retaking of territory Israel already surrendered doesn’t seem like something our leaders would seriously entertain – despite how clear it’s become to so many Israelis that the only way for us to defend the country’s south is to retake Gaza and establish full Israeli control.
The view of the Israeli security establishment has been, thanks to US support, a confrontation tomorrow is always preferable than a confrontation today. While it is certainly true that the IDF capabilities are growing, the same can be said of the capabilities of our enemies.
In 1993, our enemies fought with knives and axes. in 2003, with bombs and suicide vests. In 2013, with missiles and rockets. In 2023, with the sophisticated drone technology and organizational capability to execute what we saw on Simḥat Torah. Unlike Rispman and Levy’s portrayal of Nazi Germany, our enemies’ strengths have not yet been maximized, thanks to their lifelines in Tehran, Doha, Brussels, and Washington.
Israel can no longer afford to delay the confrontation. While we are getting stronger, but so are our enemies. Recent events have made that clear. One cannot brand Hamas as ISIS (as Bibi Netanyahu has) and then declare victory at anything less than their eradication. One cannot relocate a half-million residents in the Gaza and Lebanon border areas under constant rocket fire and the threat of invasion and expect them to return while the very threats that drove them out are still present.
The strategy of Israeli appeasement, if it ever had any value to begin with, has certainly now run its course. Now is the time for confrontation, and b’ezrat HaShem, a time for victory.
